It’s a long read and worth it, because it beautifully explores the theme.
But these are two quotes that summarize the main though:
God:
Why, the idea that I could possibly have created you without free will [is a fallacy]! You acted as if this were a genuine possibility, and wondered why I did not choose it! It never occurred to you that a sentient being without free will is no more conceivable than a physical object which exerts no gravitational attraction. (There is, incidentally, more analogy than you realize between a physical object exerting gravitational attraction and a sentient being exerting free will!) Can you honestly even imagine a conscious being without free will? What on earth could it be like?
And
Don’t you see that the so-called “laws of nature” are nothing more than a description of how in fact you and other beings do act? They are merely a description of how you act, not a prescription of of how you should act, not a power or force which compels or determines your acts. To be valid a law of nature must take into account how in fact you do act, or, if you like, how you choose to act.
I don’t think the excerpt you provided addresses the points I was making. What do we mean by free will? Presumably it’s the idea that a person is able to make their own choices, and they’re not being controlled by some external force.
On the one hand, yes, I can imagine a conscious being without free will - imagine a scientist could disconnect the nerves that control your body and replace them with a remote control, but the nerves which provide sensation stay - someone else is driving the car, but you still see and hear what’s going on.
But that’s not what I mean when I say free will is absurd. I mean the idea that we could act without reference to our past experiences, conversations, physical circumstance, DNA, isn’t plausible. Yes, I like to eat fruit loops for breakfast! They taste good and I enjoy the sensation. I have “free will” to eat gravel instead, but I don’t.
In the normal mundane world that’s fine - we can say we have free will. In the case where we argue that an all knowing and all powerful God exists that’s an issue. Because God knows every possible force and prior circumstance that will act on us, and he put those forces into motion. So such a God would have decided for us what will happen.
The following two are more relevant quotes to your points:
Mortal:
Well, are my acts determined by the laws of nature or aren’t they?
God:
The word determined here is subtly but powerfully misleading and has contributed so much to the confusions of the free will versus determinism controversies. Your acts are certainly in accordance with the laws of nature, but to say they are determined by the laws of nature creates a totally misleading psychological image which is that your will could somehow be in conflict with the laws of nature and that the latter is somehow more powerful than you, and could “determine” your acts whether you liked it or not. But it is simply impossible for your will to ever conflict with natural law. You and natural law are really one and the same.
Mortal:
What do you mean that I cannot conflict with nature? Suppose I were to become very stubborn, and I determined not to obey the laws of nature. What could stop me? If I became sufficiently stubborn even you could not stop me!
God:
You are absolutely right! I certainly could not stop you. Nothing could stop you. But there is no need to stop you, because you could not even start! As Goethe very beautifully expressed it, “In trying to oppose Nature, we are, in the very process of doing so, acting according to the laws of nature!” Don’t you see that the so-called “laws of nature” are nothing more than a description of how in fact you and other beings do act? They are merely a description of how you act, not a prescription of of how you should act, not a power or force which compels or determines your acts. To be valid a law of nature must take into account how in fact you do act, or, if you like, how you choose to act.
So the free will isn’t as tied to non-determism as we like to think. This leads us to a false dichotomy. And you will have read correctly that Smullyan doesn’t see the ‘God’ as all-powerful but rather more all-enveloping, the God isn’t detached from the person as he’s thinking. Also that the god image of the percieved Judeo-Christian faiths are a bit different than the God in a taoïst understanding (which Smullyan adheres to and thinks of as a more logical deistich model.
His main point is about the misunderstanding of determinsm, as in the following passage:
God:
It is interesting that you have twice now used the phrase “determined to act” instead of “chosen to act.” This identification is quite common. Often one uses the statement “I am determined to do this” synonymously with “I have chosen to do this.” This very psychological identification should reveal that determinism and choice are much closer than they might appear. Of course, you might well say that the doctrine of free will says that it is you who are doing the determining, whereas the doctrine of determinism appears to say that your acts are determined by something apparently outside you. But the confusion is largely caused by your bifurcation of reality into the “you” and the “not you.” Really now, just where do you leave off and the rest of the universe begin? Or where does the rest of the universe leave off and you begin? Once you can see the so-called “you” and the so-called “nature” as a continuous whole, then you can never again be bothered by such questions as whether it is you who are controlling nature or nature who is controlling you. Thus the muddle of free will versus determinism will vanish. If I may use a crude analogy, imagine two bodies moving toward each other by virtue of gravitational attraction. Each body, if sentient, might wonder whether it is he or the other fellow who is exerting the “force.” In a way it is both, in a way it is neither. It is best to say that it is the configuration of the two which is crucial.
A good read on the inverse of what you’re stating, namely that free will is logical:
https://www.mit.edu/people/dpolicar/writing/prose/text/godTaoist.html
Got to be honest, I started reading that, saw how long it was and stopped. Would you want to share the gist?
It’s a long read and worth it, because it beautifully explores the theme.
But these are two quotes that summarize the main though:
And
Thanks for sharing.
I don’t think the excerpt you provided addresses the points I was making. What do we mean by free will? Presumably it’s the idea that a person is able to make their own choices, and they’re not being controlled by some external force.
On the one hand, yes, I can imagine a conscious being without free will - imagine a scientist could disconnect the nerves that control your body and replace them with a remote control, but the nerves which provide sensation stay - someone else is driving the car, but you still see and hear what’s going on.
But that’s not what I mean when I say free will is absurd. I mean the idea that we could act without reference to our past experiences, conversations, physical circumstance, DNA, isn’t plausible. Yes, I like to eat fruit loops for breakfast! They taste good and I enjoy the sensation. I have “free will” to eat gravel instead, but I don’t.
In the normal mundane world that’s fine - we can say we have free will. In the case where we argue that an all knowing and all powerful God exists that’s an issue. Because God knows every possible force and prior circumstance that will act on us, and he put those forces into motion. So such a God would have decided for us what will happen.
The following two are more relevant quotes to your points:
So the free will isn’t as tied to non-determism as we like to think. This leads us to a false dichotomy. And you will have read correctly that Smullyan doesn’t see the ‘God’ as all-powerful but rather more all-enveloping, the God isn’t detached from the person as he’s thinking. Also that the god image of the percieved Judeo-Christian faiths are a bit different than the God in a taoïst understanding (which Smullyan adheres to and thinks of as a more logical deistich model.
His main point is about the misunderstanding of determinsm, as in the following passage:
That was an excellent read, thank you!