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- cross-posted to:
- [email protected]
Google’s latest flagship smartphone raises concerns about user privacy and security. It frequently transmits private user data to the tech giant before any app is installed. Moreover, the Cybernews research team has discovered that it potentially has remote management capabilities without user awareness or approval.
Cybernews researchers analyzed the new Pixel 9 Pro XL smartphone’s web traffic, focusing on what a new smartphone sends to Google.
“Every 15 minutes, Google Pixel 9 Pro XL sends a data packet to Google. The device shares location, email address, phone number, network status, and other telemetry. Even more concerning, the phone periodically attempts to download and run new code, potentially opening up security risks,” said Aras Nazarovas, a security researcher at Cybernews…
… “The amount of data transmitted and the potential for remote management casts doubt on who truly owns the device. Users may have paid for it, but the deep integration of surveillance systems in the ecosystem may leave users vulnerable to privacy violations,” Nazarovas said…
What is the advantage over Calyx/Lineage/iode OS on compatible devices? I just don’t want Google to have any of my money at all. Buying a privacy solution from them recoups their loss.
It’s my understanding that Graphene has security as its main goal, not privacy, though it’s also quite private.
I don’t know about Calyx or Iode but Lineage doesn’t allow for a locked bootloader. This is a massive security hole and without security, sooner or later, your privacy will be violated.
Currently, GrapheneOS on a newer Pixel are the only phones that Celebrite can’t breach. Celebrite machines are cheap enough that the border guards and your local cops probably have one. In my country, it’s the law that a cop is allowed to examine a phone during a traffic stop.
One underrated feature of the Graphene OS is that you can set a duress PIN that wipes your entire phone when entered.
I have the duress pin/password set, the pin is written on a post-it in the case.
I should clarify, the cop can give the phone a once over but not connect to a machine or clone the phone. Cloning is a bit more involved - legally speaking.
Oh, I was mostly leaving the comment for other people who might be interested in the feature.
That’s not a bad idea. If someone steals the phone, they might inadvertently erase it for you if they find that post-it.
Mainly the locked bootloader that GrapheneOS offers. It’s more secure, and GrapheneOS emphasizes security over all else, but privacy features are part of that security.
As well as all the other security features offered by Pixels, like the Titan M2 secure element, which securely stores encryption keys and makes brute-force attacks basically impossible.
Other OSs let you lock the bootloader too. I know that iodéOS and CalyxOS do, for example.
I like calyx, might try graphene some day. But I absolutely won’t run Google’s play services ala graphene. It’s sandboxed, supposedly, but why run it at all?
Calyx uses microG, a much smaller, fully open source emulator of Google’s services.
Because it is unfortunately required by some apps. microG is not a viable alternative, as it requires root access on the device, which drastically reduces the security. It also has worse compatibility than Sandboxed Play services, and doesn’t offer much of a benefit. It still downloads and executes proprietary Google blobs in the background in order to function. Apps that require Google services also include a proprietary Google library, making microG essentially useless. It’s an open source layer that sits between a proprietary library and a proprietary network service, using proprietary binaries and requiring root access. You gain absolutely nothing from using it, and significantly increases the attack surface of your device.
This is simply false, as I explained, only a tiny bit of what microG requires to function is open source
You’re far better off using Sandboxed Play services on GrapheneOS
Dude I’m looking at the source code, there’s only a binary downloaded for enabling Safety net. Why are you making false statements?
@RubberElectrons @multi_regime_enjoyer its not actually fully open source, it uses a lot of closed-source libraries, and its not as battle-tested as google’s official one so there really isn’t a reason to use it
Just about all of your identifying data is stripped out by the framework before interacting with Google at all: https://github.com/microg/GmsCore/wiki/Google-Network-Connections
That alone makes it an important tool. I’m not too worried about memory exploits as I don’t really install apps, but it’s an important feature in graphene’s toolkit.
For most people who want an Android alternative that’s open source but don’t have time to fiddle with it, calyxOS seems like a good solution. It just works out of the box.
This is literally nothing special, as all user-installed apps are denied access to identifiers like the IMEI and MAC address since Android 10. Since GrapheneOS isolates Play services in the Android application sandbox, they don’t have access to any of these identifiers either.
That’s not how memory corruption exploits work. These can occur anywhere in the system, and just need to be triggered by an attacker. This doesn’t require you to install an app, receiving a rogue message might for example be enough to exploit a memory vulnerability in the SMS app. Visiting a rogue website, which loads malicious JavaScript can be enough to trigger a memory corruption vulnerability in the Chromium WebView. That’s why GrapheneOS doesn’t just use hardened_malloc, but it also disables the JavaScript JIT compiler in Vanadium by default, and offers a toggle in the settings to disallow JavaScript JIT compilation in all apps making use of the system WebView component.
Very nice. Can I use the much smaller codebase of microG instead of Google’s? Even you do not know how Play Services actually works, and that’s a problem.
Further, a memory exploit that leads to compromise would need a chain of privilege escalation. There’s a lot in the way of making that trivial even on stock Android. And you know what helps reduce risk of exploit? Smaller codebases.
If you only care about security, you should keep Play Services isolated in a separate profile. That way, even if there happens to be a memory corruption vulnerability in Play services, which isn’t caught by hardened_malloc or the hardware MTE in newer devices with ARMv9 chips, the rest of your system would still be safe, since Play services aren’t running as root, and in order to compromise the entire system, there would need to be a privilege escalation vulnerability in all of Android, not just Play services.
Why does CalyxOS include the F-Droid privileged extension then? It’s yet another component running with elevated permissions and unnecessarily increasing attack surface. Why does it include Google’s eUICC component with elevated privileges and no proper sandboxing?
Err… That component appears to be built from source per Calyx’s Gradle rules? The source is pulled from here: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/refs/heads/main/telephony/java/android/telephony/euicc
My hardware is too old to support MTE. I’m running a pixel 3 because I’m more worried about damaging our earthly environment with this constant hardware churn.
I’m sorry you’re unhappy that I’m happy. I’m still able to run Android 14 in a reasonably secure manner, I’m able to exchange information with other people easily, without Google getting much information from me, and that’s satisfactory. My actual security relevant machinations happen on my much better protected laptop.
Thanks for your input, have a nice day.
That’s apparently not the entire thing though. I haven’t used CalyxOS in a long time, could go to the settings menu for adding a new eSIM and take a screenshot of it?
Oh I’m absolutely not. I’m glad you found an OS you like, I just pointed out that GrapheneOS is far superior in terms of privacy and security, and therefore probably the better choice, but you are obviously free to use whatever suits your needs and makes you happy. And it’s better than the stock OS I guess.
How do you protect a laptop to be more secure than a modern mobile device? Desktop operating systems are inherently less secure, since they lack proper application sandboxing, they often don’t even have mandatory access control mechanisms (such as SELinux or AppArmor) in place and don’t have a good way of verifying the boot image. Secure Boot is broken and essentially useless, and can’t be compared to Android Verified Boot whatsoever. TPMs aren’t secure either, and can’t even remotely be compared with proper secure elements such as the Google Titan M2 or Apple’s Secure Enclave. Do you use QubesOS, or how did you achieve better protection on your laptop compared to your smartphone?
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Calyx doesn’t actually support Google Play Services or Google Services Framework. It uses microG, a sometimes buggy workaround that requires root access and has pretty poor compatibility. GrapheneOS on the other hand uses the official Google Play binaries, but isolates them in the Android application sandbox, instead of installing them as system apps with special privileges (like it is the case on stock Android). You can read more about it at https://grapheneos.org/features#sandboxed-google-play
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I’m not entirely sure if all of microG needs to run as root, but I’m pretty sure that some parts do. Nonetheless, microG runs in the
priv_appSELinux domain instead ofuntrusted_app, reducing the isolation and granting it more access to sensitive APIs. Sandboxed Google Play on GrapheneOS on the other hand is a normal application that can be installed and uninstalled by the user, running in theuntrusted_appdomain. It is tightly controlled by the Android permission mechanism, and doesn’t have any permissions by default.