Al_Sham [she/her]

Bint al-Sham

  • 1 Post
  • 264 Comments
Joined 10 months ago
cake
Cake day: December 14th, 2023

help-circle


  • How Palestinian Resistance Leader Yahya Sinwar Led the Negotiations for the 2011 Prisoner Exchange From Inside Prison

    When Ahmed Ghandour was released from Ashkelon Prison in 1994, he promised his comrades still inside that he would help them achieve freedom. A few years after he arrived in Gaza, he, alongside Ahmed Al-Jabari and Marwan Issa, engineered and executed the Operation Dissipated Illusion.

    On June 25, 2006, at 5:15 a.m., a group of Palestinian Resistance fighters infiltrated through a tunnel to the outskirts of the Kerem Shalom border crossing east of the Gaza Strip and attacked an occupation military outpost. That day, the occupation army woke up to an announcement from Abu Obeida, the military spokesperson for Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, stating that the resistance succeeded in killing two Israeli soldiers and injuring five others, in addition to capturing the soldier Gilad Shalit. Abu Obeida summed it up: “Shalit will not be released except through a prisoner exchange.”

    Netanyahu tasked Ofer Dekel with pressuring the resistance leadership in the prisons. He asked him to go to the Prisons Service to arrange a meeting with Hamas leaders in Hadarim Prison to have them pressure the leadership outside. The security official met with prisoners Tawfiq Abu Naim, Yahya Sinwar, and Abdel Nasser Issa. A few days after this meeting, whose echoes reverberated in the prison and were conveyed through the prison administration to other prisons, the Prisons Service transferred all the Hamas leaders in the prisons, including Sinwar and all the detained members of the Legislative Council, to the Negev desert prison. The prison administration provided the prisoners with a cell phone and asked them to contact the Hamas leadership outside so that they would soften their position in exchange for releasing all of them in a preliminary exchange. The prisoners’ leadership noticed the trap that the Israelis had set and how they sought to sow confusion and dissent among the prisoners, especially those sentenced to life imprisonment, not to mention the sick, elderly, children, and women. However, the resistance factions, in all exchange operations that they conduct, ensure that the release does not include only specific individuals from the same party, but primarily aims to include all categories of prisoners from all organizations.

    The prisoners’ leadership handed over the phone to the prison administration and informed them of its position and condition: that only Yahya Sinwar would be released and that he must be delivered safely to the Gaza Strip for consultation with the leadership on the issue of the exchange deal. Of course, Dekel rejected Sinwar’s offer, which thwarted the Israeli plan. In less than an hour, the Prisons Service returned the prisoners to the prisons from which they had been gathered.

    Negotiations remained frozen throughout 2010, especially after Sinwar learned the details—from his lawyer visiting him in prison—of the negotiation agreement that had been presented at al-Zahar’s house. The planned agreement excluded many senior prisoners, especially those who had planned and executed major operations, including Hassan Salameh, Abdullah Barghouti, and Ibrahim Hamed.

    Through a phone smuggled to Room 11 of Beersheba Prison, Sinwar made a call to al-Zahar informing him of his position and the prisoners who rejected the proposed deal. Sinwar then made another call to the leader Khaled Meshal, informing him of his objection and that of all the prisoners. Meshal promised Sinwar that he would halt the deal, and this is what happened.

    Before dismantling the phone and hiding it to avoid detection, Sinwar made his final call to his brother Mohammed Sinwar, saying to him: “Say hello to Hajj [referring to his former cellmate Ahmed Al-Jabari] and tell him that the trust he has is not in vain” (referring to the captive Shalit).

    Sinwar specified from inside his prison the price for the release of Gilad Shalit. The agreement was concluded on October 11, 2011, with the Netanyahu government announcing its approval of the deal with Hamas which achieved the liberation of 1,027 Palestinian prisoners, including Yahya Sinwar.


  • Ansarallah is primarily, but not exclusively, Zaydi Shia (Iran and Lebanon are Twelver Shia).

    Syria is incredibly diverse and has Sunnis, Shia, and Alawites as well as Christians and Druze.

    Palestinians are almost exclusively Sunni.

    Sunni Muslims don’t view Ali ibn Abi Talib (as) as Emir al Mumineen, but they do still revere him as the Lion of Allah (swt) and a great warrior and leader and Sahabba (companion) who defended early Islam and Muslims. The image of the door is from the Battle of Khaibr where the Muslims defeated Jewish tribes that had previous allied with the Quraysh against Islam during the Battle of the Trench.

    It is reported in both Sunni and Shia sources that Mohammed (saw) declared he would give the banner of Islam to the Defender of the Muslims before the battle because the previous military leaders had kept surrendering. He gave the banner to Ali (as) who led the attack. Ali then fought one on one combat with the most powerful of the Jewish warriors and used Zulfiqar (the twin barbed sword) to split his head into two. This saved the battle from becoming a bloodbath because the Jews agreed to surrender after their bravest warrior was defeated. The Jews were allowed to remain in Khaibr provided they pay a tax and stop raidining Medina. Later the second caliph Umar, a figure revered by Sunni but not Shia, expelled the remaining Jews from Khaibr.

    All Muslims respect Ali (as) except Wahhabis and you will see many Palestinian fighters quoting him and recognizing him. Martyr Ibrahim al-Nabulsi, the Lion of Nablus, tattooed a dedication to Ali (as) on his arm before he was martyred.














  • The Israeli Agricultural Industry: A Strategic Weakness

    Excellently researched article. I shared only the conclusion below.

    The structural change in the Israeli agricultural industry not only affected the composition of workers in the industry but also had repercussions on food policy in the entity, which became more reliant on importing foodstuffs. This was due to the slowdown of growth of the agricultural industry, which coincided with a significant expansion in the population, compounded by the political desire to lower prices, which opened the door to imports [11].

    As mentioned earlier, the slow growth of the industry in the 1980s was the result of inflationary recession factors that affected the Israeli economy during that period, coupled with the neoliberal policies followed by Israeli governments since the late 1970s, which reduced the amount of government support for agriculture. Consequently, population growth, over time, became faster than agricultural production growth. In the 1950s, the annual growth rate of production was about 12.8%, compared to a population growth rate of 4.6%. However, this dynamic shifted in the 1990s, the decade when population growth surpassed agricultural production growth, remaining so until now, with the former reaching 2.8% while the latter reached 2% [12]. This led to dependence on food imports to meet the increasing local demand. The result was that the entity became completely dependent on imports of sugar, vegetable oils, oilseeds, animal feed, and grains [13]. Moreover, domestic production of animal products relies on imports of feed and live animals.

    This coincided with the neoliberal transformation in the Israeli economy, where the focus in the 1990s shifted towards high-value industries, especially the technology industry. Even agriculture took a significant share of this industry, with a focus on developing agricultural technology surpassing interest in agricultural production itself. At this stage, Israel chose the neoliberal model based on export orientation. The purpose of this policy was to improve the current account balance—reducing the deficit or increasing the surplus—attracting foreign direct investment, reducing external debt, and building foreign currency reserves by the central bank [14]. In contrast, other industries, including agriculture, saw declining growth rates, and their products lost competitiveness, even in domestic markets, due to the high production costs.

    It is not sustainable to be a First World Country—meaning a country with an economy focused on high-value production while abandoning quantitative production, especially concerning basic goods like food—in a hostile region that does not accept you. No matter how significant Western support may be, there are economic rules in the real-world economy that cannot be bypassed or ignored. Consumers need consumer goods, and herein lies the strategic mistake committed by the Israeli entity during the formation stage of its modern economy, specifically after the neoliberal transformation it underwent in the late 1980s. Under export-oriented neoliberalism, the focus shifted to enhancing the economy’s status on the international stage. In this context, “Israel” was able to achieve its goal. However, it simultaneously relinquished a crucial aspect of its security, which is food security.

    Amidst the brutal war that “Israel” is waging against the people of Gaza, other fronts have opened up. The attacks carried out by Yemen in the Red Sea imposing a blockade on Israeli ports from the early weeks of the ongoing war have proven that the anti-Israel camp is capable of reducing its ability to import. This poses an even larger problem in the event of a broader regional war. While today only the port of Eilat is affected by the blockade in the Red Sea, the situation could worsen if a war threatens other Israeli ports, especially those located on the Mediterranean Sea. This could trigger a food security crisis in “Israel,” which abandoned a fundamental element of its survival amidst the transition to neoliberalism.